The Resolution of the "Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs" 07.04.2006 21:04
Der nachfolgende Artikel zeigt das Wirken dieser "Truppe":
Smoking Gun on Plans for IRAN
The Jewish decision on Iran and America's assigned role in this coming conflict was taken
in 1998, over eight years ago and well before 9/11 and the current Zionist escapade in Iraq.
Here is the smoking gun: http://ADL.cc/iranr453.htm While gentile politicians are unable to see beyond the next election, Jewish strategists are busy calculating their next move years ahead - just as they were when they plotted the First World War and the death of millions at the Zionist congress of 1897 in Basel, Switzerland. A lesson for the goyim.
Continuing the fight for a better world: NEW ORDER, Dept E, PO Box 270486
Milwaukee WI 53227
The Resolution below is indisputable evidence of Zionist ambitions to rule the world when Jews express concerns regarding a sovereign country's right to obtain air defense systems. Logo below boasts about Zionist control of U.S. armed forces.
Spring 1998 Board Resolution - Iran
Resolution on Iran
March 22, 1998
Whereas the government of Iran has pursued a course of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology for many years and is coming closer to indigenous capabilities in those areas;
Whereas on its present course, Iran will shortly have an offensive missile capability that threatens US service personnel stationed in the Middle East as well as US friends and allies in the region - Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt;
Whereas a variety of governments have assisted in these efforts, most notably Russia, China and France [French defense companies being in whole or in part owned by the government];
Whereas the government of Iran finances and arms violent, anti-American, anti-Israel Islamic fundamentalist movements which seek to punish moderate Muslims as well as undermine Western democratic interests; and
Whereas the United States considers Iran a sponsor of terrorism and lists Iran as such in the State Department's Annual Report on Terrorism, and has enacted the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act:
The Board of Directors of JINSA expresses strong skepticism that the election of Mohammed Khatami as President of Iran indicates any changed military or political policies of the government of Iran. While President Khatami has made comments that are more moderate than were those of his predecessor, the Board strongly encourages the Administration and Congress to judge Iran by its military acquisitions and capabilities, and support of terrorism rather than by nuances in rhetoric. The Board recognizes that there is strong international pressure, including from America's friends, to ease its stance toward Iran, and is concerned that this may move the Administration.
- To the extent that President Khatami chooses to or is able to exercise a moderating influence within the Iranian government, the Board would expect termination of its WMD programs and support of terrorism. Only in light of such actions would the Board encourage the Administration to make overtures to the government of Iran.
- At the same time, the Board notes with satisfaction the enthusiastic welcome accorded American athletes in Teheran and emphasizes that its concern is with the government's military capabilities, not with the Iranian people. The Board would welcome more such civilian exchanges.
The Board of Directors applauds the action of a Federal Judge in ordering the government of Iran to pay $247.5 million to the family of Alisa M. Flatow who was murdered by Iranian-backed terrorists in the Gaza Strip. The Board believes that holding terrorism-supporting countries to account for their actions is entirely appropriate and honorable.
The Board of Directors affirms its position that the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act is an appropriate mechanism for penalizing countries that aid Iran in acquiring or financing acquisitions of weapons technology. The Board calls upon the Administration to apply sanctions against China and Russia, as well as appropriate French entities under the Act. The Board also notes that Russia is in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and urges the Administration to consider implementing appropriate penalties. Recent statements by the Russian Prime Minister aside, The Board strongly urges Congress and the Administration to maintain its watchful attitude toward Russian exports and demand Russian compliance with agreements on technology controls.
The Board of Directors calls upon Congress and the Administration to proceed with research, development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to counter the growing threat of ballistic missiles (with conventional or non-conventional warheads) from Iran and from other countries. The Board reaffirms previous JINSA resolutions regarding national ballistic missile defenses.
The Board of Directors urges Congress and the Administration to consult closely with regional allies Israel and Turkey in assessing the threat posed to Western democratic interests by Iranian acquisitions and in dealing with that threat.
The Board of Directors urges Congress to consider strengthening export controls on sales of sensitive military and dual-use technology which cannot be acquired elsewhere to countries that are technology proliferators, notably China. Restrictions on supercomputers and military-related machine tools would be high priorities.
With the election of Mohammed Khatami as president of Iran in 1997 a debate was opened as to whether the regime was becoming more "moderate" or whether Khatami was simply a more moderate face on an implacably hostile regime. A few points are clear:
- The only candidates allowed to stand for election were those the mullahs considered "acceptable." "Unacceptable" candidates (pro-American ones, candidates advocating separation of "church" and state, or non-Muslims, for example) never made it through the selection process.
- The Iranian public voted for the least stringent and intrusive candidate who was permitted to run. Anecdotal evidence from journalists and others indicates that anti-American/Western feeling among the public is minimal and desire for Western dress, entertainment, media, etc. remains strong. This public feeling found expression recently in the enthusiastic treatment of American athletes competing in Teheran.
- The Iranian government has been involved in financing a variety of violent anti-Western Islamic fundamentalist organizations including Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza. Iran's alliance with Syria has allowed Iranian influence in Lebanon to grow. Iranian weapons, training and money control Hizballah activities in southern Lebanon, with the acquiescence of Syria. The Israeli government views Iran's inflammatory rhetoric coupled with its decisions about acquiring an indigenous nuclear, chemical and biological (WMD) and ballistic missile capability as constituting a grave threat to Israel.
Terrorism and the Flatow Suit: Since 1984, Iran has been designated by the US Department of State as a sponsor of terrorism. Recent US legislation permits US citizens who are victims of terrorism abroad to sue foreign countries in US courts if those governments have been designated sponsors of terrorism. Until 10th March, only Cuba had been ordered to pay damages for an act of terrorism under its sponsorship [the shooting down of a small plane by Cuban fighter jets over international waters]. In the Flatow case, the court heard evidence that Iran supplied virtually all of the $2 million annual budget of the Shiqaqi Faction of Islamic Jihad, which carried out the bombing in Gaza that killed American student Alisa Flatow. The group is based in Damascus, but Syria [which is also on the State Department's list of terrorism supporting countries] was not named in the suit. Judge Lamberth ordered the equivalent of three times Iran's estimated total budget for terrorism activities as punitive damages to Flatow's family.
An unnamed administration official reacted by saying, "This case is not what we needed at this time, in terms of what we are trying to do. At a time when Khatami may be trying to move a country in areas where our long-term strategic interests are involved, we don't want to smack him." "Foreign policy officials" were described by The Washington Post as indicating that "although the ruling against Iran was consistent with government assessments of Iranian links to terrorism, it risked stoking unwelcome conflict at a moment when the administration sees realistic prospects of a change of course by the Tehran government."
- The United States passed the Libya-Iran Sanctions Act requiring that we apply sanctions against companies and governments that do business with Iran (and Libya) in excess of $40 million. Our goal was to try to ensure that Iran (and Libya) does not acquire the financial means to continue their weapons acquisitions and try to ensure that countries do not sell those technologies to terrorism-supporting countries.
The Iranian government has been engaged in a long-range and intensive effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missile technology to provide a delivery system. The Iranian government has worked with China, Russia, North Korea and others in this effort. The US appears to have little influence on the Russians or the Chinese. Many European countries have provided Teheran with dual-use items; France is notorious in this area. And the U.S. itself - through loose controls on licensed technology sold to China - appears to have been a conduit for weapons-related technology to Iran.
The information below is a very general attempt to show the magnitude of Iranian acquisitions in the area of WMD and missile technology. It is by no means comprehensive in terms of countries involved or technologies involved.
Missiles and missile technology: In 1996, Israel reported "Massive Russian assistance and close cooperation with Iran and enabling the Iranian regime to develop independent capabilities to produce medium-range ballistic missile systems within a very short time." Most worrisome to Israel was the fact that the missiles would have a range of up to 1,240 miles - threatening Israel, Saudi Arabia (including the 20.000 US service personnel stationed there) and Turkey. Early in 1997, DIA confirmed the Israeli report and did not dispute the 18-24 month prediction for indigenous Iranian production. In June 1997, Boris Yeltsin denied that Russia was assisting Iran, but President Clinton warned that Congress might cut back aid to Moscow if such assistance continued. In September, Vice President Gore had a difficult meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on the subject of Russian nuclear aid to Iran, which Chernomyrdin refused to halt.
In March 1998, Gore and Chernomyrdin met again amid US fears that Iran has been developing warheads that will carry unconventional missiles. According to press reports, the Vice President offered to lift restrictions on the number of US satellites launched in Russia if Moscow cuts off the transfer of missile technology to Iran. According to US press reports, intelligence officials have said that Russia is assisting Iran in a crash program to build Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles by providing materials, equipment and technical assistance.
Russia again denied helping the Iranians, but Chernomyrdin announced that he has issued a governmental directive that he says will rectify the problem of the export of "dual use" technology if it is implemented. Vice President Gore said he was convinced that the Russians now have a policy toward export controls that is "exactly correct." Implementation of that policy, however, is questionable.
Nuclear capabilities: Germany had built a nuclear facility in Bushehr, Iran, but abandoned it after the Islamic revolution. The Russians came in with a plan for a 1,000-megawatt reactor in 1995, stating that the reactor would be for energy purposes. Hundreds of Russian scientists and thousands of Russians workers are attached to the projects. US sources said the plant would not contribute directly to weapons development, but it would add training and technology to Iranian capabilities. Also, spent fuel from the reactor could be used for the manufacture of weapons. Late in 1995, the Russians cancelled the gas centrifuge that would have recycled the spent fuel.
The plant has had some setbacks. In April 1997, the Ukrainians cancelled their planned sale of turbines for the plant, but the Russians said they had another supplier. Also in 1997, China suspended the sale of smaller nuclear reactors to Iran, and the Czech government blocked plans by a Czech company to sell reactor equipment to Iran. The financing was delayed in 1997 when the Iranians found Jews connected to the Russian bank doing the financing, and anti-earthquake measures will add an estimated one year to the completion time. In 1992, the CIA projected Iranian nuclear weapons by the year 2000; in 1995, ACDA projected the year 2003; in 1998, the director of the CIA projected Iranian nuclear weapons between 2005 and 2007. Some Israeli sources, however, believe Iran is only about two years from building a bomb. [Israel was much closer to an accurate prediction about Iraqi capabilities during the 1980s and into this decade, so Israeli assessments tend to carry great weight in the professional community.]
According to the CIA, Iran is the country presently most active in seeking both WMD technology and conventional weapons.
China is involved in proliferation of WMD technology to a variety of countries including Iran. According to Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, "Since 1980, China has supplied billions of dollars worth of nuclear weapon, chemical weapon and missile technology to south Asia, South Africa, South America and the Middle East. It has done so in the teeth of US protests, and despite repeated promises to stop. The exports are still going on, and while they do, they make it impossible for the United States and its allies to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction."
Poison Gas: In 1995, Milhollin wrote in the New York Times that the US had caught China exporting poison gas ingredients to Iran, and that the sales had been going on for at least three years. In 1996, the press reported that China was sending entire factories for making poison gas to Iran, including special glass-lined vessels for mixing precursor chemicals. The shipments also included 400 tons of chemicals useful making nerve agents. US officials say that sales are continuing despite the US government's decision in May 1997 to sanction five Chinese individuals and two companies for contributing to Iran's chemical weapons program.
Nuclear Technology: In 1993-94, the Institute of Plasma Physics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences transferred a nuclear fusion research reactor to the Azad University in Tehran. The reactor is a training device ostensibly used for peaceful purposes. The Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology (BRIUG) has been helping Iran prospect for uranium, which would likely go into Iran's nuclear weapons program. China has been talking about selling a 25-20 megawatt reactor, although plans appear suspended.
In mid-March The Washington Post reported that in January 1998 the National Security Agency had discovered a deal involving hundreds of tons of anhydrous fluoride to be shipped from China to Iran. When the US confronted the Chinese government in February, Chinese officials argued that the material was not on the list of controlled nuclear substances maintained by international arms control authorities. But within two weeks, according to reports, senior Chinese officials assured the Americans that the sale would not occur. Anhydrous fluoride had many uses, including refining uranium ore into a gas, uranium hexafluoride, in order to filter out nonfissionable material and increase the concentration of fissionable U-235. The Administration has pronounced itself satisfied that the deal is off.
Passage through the US
There is evidence that American technology has been behind some Chinese exports to Iran, although the US is not directly involved in any sales of technology to Iran. Gary Milhollin listed two cases in testimony before Congress in October 1997:
The C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles: Iran bought these from China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation in 1997 and appears to have up to 60 of them, plus fast attack boats to carry them. The US Commerce Department approved sensitive, controlled equipment for export to China Precision Machinery (1989-93) including computer workstations for the simulation of wind effects, flight data recorders, and navigational instruments. According to Milhollin, "The ability to simulate wind effects is something the designer of an anti-ship missile would find quite useful." He noted that China Precision Machinery was sanctioned in 1993 by the US for exporting missile components to Pakistan.
Air Surveillance Radar: Iran imported powerful surveillance radar from the China National Electronics Import-Export Corporation. The radar can detect targets up to 300 km away and is now part of Iran's air defense system. Between 1989 and 1993, the US Commerce Department approved controlled equipment worth $9.7 million to China National Electronics, including equipment for microwave research, a very large scale integrated system for testing integrated circuits, equipment for making semiconductors, and a shipment of computer gear worth $4.3 million. Each of these items needed a validated export license to leave the United States.
Aside from general trade with Iran, Total SA, a French company, has teamed with Russia's Gazprom for a $2 billion deal for natural gas exploration with Iran. The profits of that deal will make it possible for Iran to finance its military technology purchases and further its violent, anti-Western agenda. As they did with Iraq in the 1980s, the French are profiting by creating a military monster they cannot control. It should be sufficient to note that the French sold the Osirak reactor to Saddam Hussein.
ARTICLE SOURCE: ADL American Defense League dedicated to American interests
Es dürfte nicht schwerfallen, hier die Spreu vom Weizen zu trennen, d.h. heisst zwischen Anklage und Fakten zu unterscheiden. Was den Ersten Weltkrieg und die weiteren Folgen betrifft, so verweisen wir auf das auf politonline vorgestellte Werk von Wolfgang Eggert:
Im Namen Gottes - Israels Geheimvatikan als Vollstrecker biblischer Prophetie